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EXISTENTIAL HUMANISM AND 
MORAL FREEDOM IN SIMONE 
DE BEAUVOIR’S ETHICS 
Tove Pettersen 
 
This chapter elucidates the close connection between Beauvoir’s ethics and 
humanism, and argues that her humanism is an existential humanism. Beauvoir’s 
concept of freedom is inspected, followed by a discussion of her reasons for 
making moral freedom the leading normative value, and her claim that we must 
act for humanity. In Beauvoir’s ethics, freedom is not reserved for the elite, but 
understood as everyone being “able to surpass the given toward an open future.” 
By addressing the continuing friction between individual freedom and public 
interests, Beauvoir’s normative thinking remains highly relevant today. It also 
exemplifies the enduring importance of humanistic reflections and demonstrates 
how, through critical and creative thinking, the humanities can contribute to a 
free, well-functioning democratic society. 
 
To be free is not to have the power to do anything you like: it is to be 
able to surpass the given toward an open future. 
Pyrrhus and Cineas, Simone de Beauvoir 
 
1. Introduction 
 
According to Simone de Beauvoir, the foundation of all values is human free-
dom. Consequently, norms are not given by nature, biology, science, or God, 
but created and installed by individuals. However, when particular sets of 
norms are internalized and societies, for generations, are organized in accord-
ance with certain standards, the human-made origin of norms and arrange-
ments can become obscured. What was once socially constructed might later 
be perceived as fixed and natural. In several works, Beauvoir is concerned 
with revealing how conventional norms and standards, privileges and discrim-
ination were established, and how they are sustained, prolonged, and often 
masked. Pyrrhus and Cineas (2004e), The Ethics of Ambiguity (1976), The 
Second Sex (2010), “Right-Wing Thought Today” (2012d), and The Coming 
of Age (1973) are examples of such works. De-masking oppressive myths and 
false justifications of privilege is a core theme in Beauvoir’s philosophy, as 
well as an important topic in her novels. She considers such de-masking to be 
the first step toward liberation of the under-privileged. Beauvoir also provides 
a normative theory, in which the opportunity—as well as limits—to enjoy 
one’s freedom extends equally to all. 
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In revealing the origin of norms and social structures, and by articulating 
and defending certain values over others, Beauvoir acts in perfect accordance 
with the most important tasks of the humanities: to articulate, analyze, criti-
cize, assess, and create values. Philosophy and literature are two humanistic 
disciplines wherein critical discussions of values and experiences have a par-
ticular and prominent place, and these are also the two disciplines in which 
Beauvoir excelled and made a significant contribution. She states: 
 
[Literature] allows one to undergo imaginary experiences that are as 
complete and disturbing as lived experiences. The reader ponders, 
doubts, and takes sides; and this hesitant development of his thought en-
riches him in a way no teaching of doctrines could. (2004b, p. 270)  
 
With its focus on critical and creative thinking, the humanities fosters under-
standing and breadth of vision, while creating an entirely new way of thinking 
and acting. With regard to moral philosophy, Beauvoir remarks:  
 
The great moralists were not virtuous souls, docilely subject to a pre-
established code of good and evil. They created a new universe of values 
through words that were actions, through actions that bit into the world; 
and they changed the face of the earth more profoundly than kings and 
conquerors. (2004c, p. 188)  
 
In this chapter, I will discuss aspects of Beauvoir’s normative philoso-
phy in relation to humanism. These aspects demonstrate that Beauvoir, by 
urging her readers to engage actively in public life by reflecting upon lived 
experiences and challenging the canon, is an important humanist thinker. 
They also reveal a close connection between Beauvoir’s ethics and human-
ism. To support the claim that Beauvoir is a humanist thinker, I will first ex-
amine the core value of Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics—freedom—and then 
present her arguments for why we should sustain and promote this value in 
particular. These arguments, I contend, reveal that Beauvoir’s ethics can be 
understood as a particular form of humanism: namely, existential humanism. 
Apart from remaining highly relevant today, Beauvoir’s ethics also exempli-
fies the enduring importance of humanistic reflections and demonstrates how 
critical and creative thinking in the humanities can serve to uphold a free and 
well-functioning democratic society (Nussbaum, 2010, pp. 23, 72). 
 
2. Freedom—According to Beauvoir 
 
A. Three Types of Freedom 
 
Beauvoir uses her entire output—but particularly Pyrrhus and Cineas 
(2004e), The Ethics of Ambiguity (1976), The Second Sex (2010), and The 
 Existential Humanism and Moral Freedom in Beauvoir’s Ethics 71 
Coming of Age (1973)—to portray different aspects of freedom. Her basic 
view is, in short, that freedom is the wellspring of all the other values and a 
sine qua non for living a meaningful but also a moral life. In that light, it 
ought to be a fundamental constitutive of everyone’s normative outlook. 
Kristana Arp distinguishes three types of freedom in Beauvoir’s work: onto-
logical; concrete; and moral (2001). It should be noted that what Arp terms 
“ontological freedom,” Beauvoir herself terms “natural freedom,” while 
“moral freedom” is also sometimes referred to as “genuine freedom” or “ethi-
cal freedom (1976, pp. 24–25). In what follows, I want to elaborate on these 
three aspects of freedom. 
Ontological freedom is the freedom we all have—by virtue of being 
human (ibid., p. 25). Beauvoir maintains that freedom is the most characteris-
tic feature of our species—before emotions, rationality, or care, which have 
been suggested by other philosophers. Ontological freedom pertains to several 
aspects of being human and is related to Beauvoir’s philosophical anthropolo-
gy: it indicates that our consciousness is free, and can transcend our personal 
situation (ibid., p. 7).  
Beauvoir’s understanding of ontological freedom also rejects the notion 
of a predetermined gendered essence that must unfold, as she claimed in her 
famous statement, “One is not born, but rather becomes, woman” (2010, p. 
283). Also, ontological freedom refers to Beauvoir’s understanding of free 
will: human beings have the capacity to act autonomously (2004e, p. 124). It 
is by putting their internal ontological freedom to use that human beings cre-
ate values. In our actions, we protect and sustain or undermine and destroy 
certain normative values; we can choose to espouse justice, care, and free-
dom, or injustice, injury, and oppression.  
Can ontological freedom find concrete expression in freely chosen ac-
tions? That will depend on the context, as the agent’s situation can open or 
close the possibilities to exercise it (1976, p. 82). Beauvoir’s second type—
concrete freedom—refers to the degree of external freedom people possess in 
a particular situation. Aspects of an agent’s situation will affect the capacity 
to choose freely and act thereon. People without civil and political rights, who 
live in poverty and distress, who have been manipulated to believe they are 
less competent or valuable than others, can hardly act as freely as more fortu-
nate ones (ibid., p. 83). People living in impoverished conditions have to 
spend their time and energy satisfying their basic needs for food and security 
(ibid., p. 88, 2004e, p. 137; Arp, 2001, pp. 120–124). Poverty, manipulation, 
and lack of rights are incompatible with Beauvoir’s concept of freedom. Op-
pressive conditions can wear ontological freedom down, or prevent its exer-
cise. Our given ontological freedom and the context of our lives—the concrete 
freedom—always work together. Ontological freedom is of little value if we 
lack concrete freedom, but concrete freedom is equally worthless if our onto-
logical freedom is diluted by oppression and manipulation. Without the one, 
we cannot enjoy the other. 
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Moral freedom (Beauvoir, 1976, p. 32) means choosing to act in such a 
way as to protect and sustain one’s own freedom and that of others (ibid., 
pp. 25–34, 72–73). Unlike ontological freedom, which is ontologically given, 
and concrete freedom, which is politically and historically pre-established, 
moral freedom is something each individual must freely embrace. One must 
want “health, knowledge, well-being and leisure for all men so that their free-
dom is not consumed in fighting sickness, ignorance, and misery” (Beauvoir, 
2004e, p. 137, emphasis added). Of the three forms, only moral freedom re-
quires a free and active commitment on the part of each individual. We can 
obviously benefit from ontological and concrete freedom without taking the 
freedom of others into account, and we can undoubtedly espouse a different 
normative value. It is exactly our ontological and concrete freedom that gives 
the possibility to do so (Arp, 2001, pp. 113–115, 150–151; Pettersen, 2011, 
pp. 96–98). 
Moral freedom is the normative core value in Beauvoir’s ethics, con-
crete freedom is the cornerstone of her political thinking, while ontological 
freedom is a metaphysical precondition for her moral philosophy. Neverthe-
less, Beauvoir’s three types of freedom are closely connected, and find ex-
pression in several aspects— ethical, political, and social—of human life.  
Where other ethicists often begin by arguing why we should choose a 
specific value—utility maximization, fairness, caring, or happiness—
Beauvoir starts by amplifying the metaphysical and political preconditions of 
our ability to choose our values. She does not assume that all human beings 
can enjoy their ontological freedom.  
Works such as Pyrrhus and Cineas, The Ethics of Ambiguity, The Se-
cond Sex and The Coming of Age can be read as examinations of both the in-
ternal and external conditions enabling us to act as moral beings. Having the 
capacity and possibility to choose freely—by being so constituted (ontologi-
cal freedom) and by living under social and political conditions where it is 
actually feasible (concrete freedom)—is a necessary condition for being able 
to choose one value rather than another. In that sense, ontological and con-
crete freedoms are also preconditions for choosing whether to act morally. 
 
B. Unconstrained Freedom 
 
By introducing moral freedom, Beauvoir counters familiar arguments against 
existentialism, namely that making human beings the sole creators of all val-
ues could result in a world of solipsistic egoists, miserable relativists, and 
lonely subjectivists who, in the name of freedom, can choose any value—
including values that lead them to oppress everyone else (2004a, p. 203, 1976, 
p. 156). This would correspond to some of the behavioral types Beauvoir also 
criticizes in The Ethics of Ambiguity, among which is a type she terms “the 
adventurer.” Although adventurers make free choices and transcend their situ-
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ations, they have not achieved moral freedom because they fail to consider the 
freedom of others when acting (1976, pp. 59–63).  
Beauvoir claims that even if we, as human beings, have the capacity to 
subjugate others and ourselves, we can also choose not to do everything of 
which we are capable. If we chose to acknowledge others’ freedom as well as 
our own, we will refrain from acts of subjugation. Choosing to respect our 
own and others’ freedom means we are voluntarily restraining the potential 
use of our capacities. Consequently, in assuming moral freedom as our nor-
mative value, we also relate to concrete and ontological freedoms in a particu-
lar way: our actions must not detract from our own or others’ opportunities to 
lead an autonomous life. The type of activities and projects in which we partic-
ipate must not obliterate our own or others’ opportunities to flourish and de-
velop. In other words, having moral freedom as our normative guideline does 
not license us to do whatever we like, but rather, it gives us the opportunity to 
preserve and protect our own freedom and that of others (ibid., p. 156). This is 
the admonition that follows from Beauvoir’s normative core value.  
It was important for Beauvoir to dismantle the understanding of freedom 
as being equivalent to having “the power to do anything you like” (ibid., 
p. 91). The way she rejected this view makes her ethics highly relevant today. 
Now, freedom is commonly understood in a similar way as it was by the op-
ponents of existentialism—the freedom to do as one likes. In contemporary 
society, “freedom” is frequently perceived as the absence of external and in-
ternal constraints on the agent.  
In “Right-Wing Thought Today,” Beauvoir identifies the agents who de-
fend this way of exercising “freedom” as commonly belonging to a group of 
privileged individuals, which defines the concept in extension and compre-
hension of only its own situation. “In earlier times for proslavery Americans, 
the idea of Freedom included the right to possess slaves; for the bourgeois of 
today it includes the right to exploit the proletariat” (2012d, p. 152).  
During current times, claiming the right to use drugs, buy and sell sexual 
services, consume pornography, carry weapons, or express hatred in public is 
often justified on the same conception of freedom, generally advocated by a 
group of (would-be) privileged. Not only does this version of freedom fail to 
respect the freedom of others (moral freedom), it also commonly remains 
ignorant of the internal and external conditions (ontological and concrete 
freedom) that must be in place to make authentic choices. Agents under op-
pression, who lack ontological and concrete freedom, often cannot act fully 
autonomously. Those who take advantage of others deprivation not only lack 
moral freedom themselves, but also act oppressively and contribute to the 
perpetuation of injustice. Consequently, Beauvoir has the following view:  
 
We have to respect freedom only when it is intended for freedom, not 
when it strays, flees itself, and resigns itself. A freedom interested in 
denying freedom must be denied. And it is not true that the recognition 
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of the freedom of others limits my own freedom: to be free is not to have 
the power to do anything you like; it is to be able to surpass the given 
toward an open future. (1976, pp. 90–91) 
 
C. The Eradication of Freedom 
 
Beauvoir’s ethics not only challenge a widespread and influential understand-
ing of freedom—then as much as now—it actually does so without denying 
the importance of individual freedom. The alternative to unconstrained indi-
vidual freedom is not to destroy it in a collective movement where some 
speak on behalf of the rest and determine their common goal. Beauvoir strives 
equally to defend freedom from thinkers and political movements who at-
tempt to eradicate it, and from those who would abuse it. One way of destroy-
ing freedom is to be found in “the myth of solidarity” (2004e, p. 107), which 
depicts human beings as part of an organism, and each individual’s role as 
determined by exteriority only, “by the place of all others” (ibid.).  
According to the myth of solidarity, each individual is understood as 
fundamentally determined by forces beyond their control, as pure passivity. 
However, Beauvoir holds that people cannot be fully determined and passive, 
because if they were, they would never act. “But” she says, “he does act; he 
does question himself. He is free, and his freedom is interiority” (ibid). In a 
similar vein, Beauvoir dismisses Freudianism in The Second Sex. Freudian-
ism, she says, replaces ontological freedom, and consequently ethics, with 
“the idea of normality”; indeed, human history as such is falsified by denying 
that human acts can be “motivated by freely posited aims,” aims that can be 
desired solely for their own sake (2010, p. 59).  
Beauvoir is equally suspicious of the idea of the universal. Unlike Im-
manuel Kant, whose moral philosophy requires us to disregard the individual 
and choose the universal, she insists on seeing and respecting the individual 
(1976, p. 156). Unlike G. F. W. Hegel, for whom “particularity appears only 
as a moment of the totality in which it must surpass itself” (ibid., p. 17), the 
particular in Beauvoir’s philosophy is not absorbed in the idea of a Zeitgeist 
(the spirit of the times). She will not submit the individual to any abstract law, 
deterministic theory, or any inevitable historical movement: Beauvoir never 
forfeits the idea that individuals have their own ontological freedom, and 
therefore are always capable of changing their goals, their situation as well as 
the course of history. 
 
D. Freedom as an Infinite Movement 
 
According to Beauvoir, freedom is also always a movement; it cannot be lim-
ited to a specific time, place, or event. This feature is shared by all three of 
Beauvoir’s aspects of freedom. One cannot truly want freedom without es-
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pousing it as infinite motion, a movement that continually rejects the re-
strictions that may divert or stop its progress toward itself. 
Besides viewing freedom as an infinite movement, Beauvoir also sees 
human beings in a similar light. Human beings are not only characterized by a 
positive will, as they are for Kant, but also by “lack of being,” a negativity 
(ibid., pp. 42, 118). This means that human beings are always more than what 
is manifest at any given moment, and also capable of becoming more—or 
something different—in the future (2004e, p. 98). When our-being-in-the-
world is always in the becoming, our ends cannot be determined once and for 
all, and our engagement in the world will never reach its completion. Our 
being is an ongoing movement—always open to intervention, alternation, and 
re-signification. After the book is written or the political issue resolved, one’s 
choices are not exhausted: one must then decide whether to write a new book, 
to engage in other political issues. If moral freedom is embraced, one also 
ensures that one’s goals and activities do not thwart the future freedom of 
oneself and others. 
 
E. Moral Freedom as Relational Freedom 
 
In everything Beauvoir wrote, but especially in Pyrrhus and Cineas and The 
Ethics of Ambiguity, she explains why we should embrace moral freedom. 
Some arguments emphasize that we should maintain our own freedom as well 
as that of others for our own good. Others focus on the interests of others, 
while still others hold that moral freedom is in our common interest. The three 
different types of arguments need to be separated only for analytical purposes 
as they all, from different perspectives, build a case for why we should choose 
to act ethically: it is for our own and the sakes of others that we should es-
pouse freedom. This reveals an important aspect of Beauvoir’s ethics: it is 
consistently intersubjective. In Beauvoir’s ethics, the agent’s motivation for 
acting morally is neither purely egoistic nor completely altruistic. 
The reason Beauvoir transcends a traditional dichotomist thinking can 
be traced back to her ontology. For Beauvoir, a human being is present in the 
world as a being connected with others: “I concern others and they concern 
me. There we have an irreducible truth. The me-others relationship is as indis-
soluble as the subject-object relationship” (1976, p. 72). Moreover, she does 
not understand one individual’s being-in-the-world as separate from, or fun-
damentally antagonistic to, another’s being-in-the world. Rather, for Beau-
voir, it is my-and-your-being-in the world, it is our being-in-the-world—it is 
being-with (Mitsein) (2010, p. 17). Human beings are perceived as unique and 
free individuals, who are also interconnected with other unique and free be-
ings, which is why we can neither be fully immersed in a collective move-
ment, nor appear as completely separated and isolated beings.  
Beauvoir’s emphasis on human beings as fundamentally relational de-
parts from the individualistic ontology of many traditional philosophers—
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including other existentialist philosophers such as Søren Kierkegaard and 
Albert Camus—where individuals are envisaged as fundamentally isolated 
and separate from each other. Moreover, Beauvoir’s accentuating of human 
beings as embodied and situated beings departs from Cartesian dualism, 
where the individual mind and will are given priority over body and situation, 
as is also the case with Kant and Hegel. She also exceeds a Marxist ontology 
where the common, bodily, and material needs unify individuals and stamp 
out their particularities and individual wills. Instead, Beauvoir accentuates 
reciprocity, connectedness, embodiment, and our freedom as irreducible indi-
vidual features. In so doing, she anticipates the relational ontology and meta-
methodology advocated by many contemporary feminist ethicists.  
Beauvoir’s ontology charts a middle way between approaching human 
beings as individualistic, self-sufficient, and self-governing on the one hand, 
and collectivistic, dependent, and determined beings on the other. It is also a 
middle way between an idealistic and a materialistic approach. In Beauvoir’s 
philosophy, human beings are both separate and connected; they have minds 
and bodies; they are free and restricted, autonomous and heteronomous be-
ings. Beauvoir’s transcendence of traditional dualisms echoes her notion of 
ambiguity; after all, her ethics is an “ethics of ambiguity.” She states:  
 
As long as there have been men and they have lived, they have all felt 
this tragic ambiguity of their condition, but as long as there have been 
philosophers and they have thought, most of them have tried to mask it. 
They have striven to reduce mind to matter, or to reabsorb matter into 
mind, or to merge them within a single substance. (1976, p. 7) 
 
Beauvoir’s clear rejection of dualist thinking based on the binary logic of ei-
ther-or, and its elimination of ambiguity by attempting to make human beings 
either pure inwardness or pure externality, not only anticipates the relational 
ontology of contemporary feminism, but also the feminist concept of relation-
al autonomy. Relational autonomy is an alternative to the traditional Kantian 
notion of autonomy where human beings are understood as sovereign beings 
that act and decide alone, unencumbered by attachments to others. It is also an 
alternative to traditions wherein human beings are considered to be deprived 
of agency (see Pettersen, 2009–2010). Beauvoir’s relational ontology also 
informs her view of society. “A society is a whole made up of individual 
parts. Its members are separate, but they are united by the need for reciprocal 
relationships” (1973, p. 321).  
Beauvoir’s concept of moral freedom must be understood relationally 
and in light of ambiguity. Ontological freedom is given to each individual, 
and must be exercised by individual choices if the external situation permits it 
(concrete freedom). However, as human beings are related, there also exists a 
connection when it comes to freedom; our freedoms are also interrelated: 
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“Our freedoms support each other like the stone in an arch, but in an arch that 
no pillars support” (2004e, p. 140). Hence, in sync with much feminist ethics 
and in contrast to an individualistic version of freedom, it would also make 
sense to call Beauvoir’s concept of moral freedom “relational freedom.” Ac-
cording to Beauvoir, relational freedom is precisely the kind of freedom we 
should adopt as our core normative value. But why choose this as our maxim? 
Why select the freedom of all as our moral goal? 
 
3. Humanism—and Beauvoir’s Ethics of Freedom  
 
As there are no pre-given values, freedom is necessary if we are to create 
meaning in our lives. Making life meaningful is an ongoing process. That 
process has what could be portrayed as several stages or phases. The first 
thing we need to do is exercise our freedom by choosing the individual pro-
jects we want to engage in. Otherwise, we will end up leading inauthentic and 
unhappy lives. 
 
A. Existential Meaning 
 
The first argument for why we should embrace freedom emphasizes our per-
sonal existential situation and its relation with freedom. By practicing our free-
dom, we can establish our goals and create and participate in self-chosen pro-
jects that give our lives meaning. Only when our projects are freely embraced 
can our lives be autonomous and authentic. If we let others decide how we 
should live—for example, by uncritically adopting traditional gender roles, or 
submitting to religious or political doctrines—we are just following directives 
and norms not freely consented to. This is equivalent to living un-freely. As 
un-free, we experience existential meaninglessness and we do not develop our 
full potential (2010, pp. 661–664) because only our own freedom can be the 
source of authentic values and meaning. When norms are imposed from with-
out, or simply uncritically adopted, they are heteronomous and inauthentic.  
Our actions and projects reveal the extent to which we are free; through 
them, we sustain and create authentic values—or we perpetuate the values 
imposed on us by others. This explains why one of the most heinous punish-
ments that can be imposed on a human being is that of Sisyphus. The mean-
inglessness of having to perform pointless tasks over and over again—like 
filling and emptying the same ditch, or writing lines at school—is more intol-
erable than the feeling of exhaustion one gets from doing this work (Beauvoir, 
1976, p. 30). Likewise, a life in prison is the hardest punishment because it 
keeps the individual’s existence in a state of pure facticity, a situation that 
cannot (easily) be changed.  
Beauvoir depicts inauthentic lives in many of her writings, and her por-
trayal of women’s situation in The Second Sex is possibly the best known. 
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Here she explains why women living as traditional mothers and wives often 
find their lives meaningless: they did not freely choose to live this way; they 
are only following conventions. In The Coming of Age, Beauvoir describes 
how external (culture, body, myths) and internal (emotional and existential) 
factors restrict elderly persons’ freedom of choice: 
 
A limited future, and a frozen past: such is the situation that the elderly 
have to face up to. In many instances it paralyses them. All their plans 
have either been carried out or abandoned, and their life has closed in 
about itself; nothing requires their present; they no longer have anything 
whatsoever to do. (1973, p. 562) 
 
Consequently, when the elderly lose the opportunity to pursue freely 
chosen projects in the world, they may experience meaninglessness and, as 
Beauvoir mentions, melancholia, depression, anxiety, or even suicidal tenden-
cies. She also draws attention to how the consequences of choosing an inau-
thentic life in youth extend into old age. When old, there are no, or very few, 
new freely chosen projects or relationships to engage in. The opportunity to 
start something new is limited, and the elderly are “thrown out” of the com-
munity and become more isolated (2012e, p. 342). Therefore, the best invest-
ment in old age is to create and engage in projects and relationships during 
young adulthood that can be prolonged into old age. 
 
B. Ethical Responsibility 
 
Those capable of making free choices, but who refrain from doing so, will not 
only experience meaninglessness, but also, according to Beauvoir, live uneth-
ically. In addition to its existential side, autonomous choice also has a signifi-
cant ethical dimension. It is the first step toward living as a moral person, and 
thus, another reason why we should embrace freedom. Beauvoir writes, “to 
will oneself free is to effect the transition from nature to morality by estab-
lishing a genuine freedom on the original upsurge of our existence” (1976, p. 
25). In other words, “to will oneself moral and to will oneself free is one and 
the same decision” (ibid., p. 24).  
One of Beauvoir’s points, advanced in The Ethics of Ambiguity, is that 
when we unreflectively follow conventions, indulge in pre-established ethical 
systems, a religion, a political ideology, or just “go with the flow,” we do not 
take responsibility for our actions and ourselves. Disclaiming this ethical re-
sponsibility by uncritically following others can lead not only to dogmatism 
and fanaticism, but also to violence, brutality, and evil carried out in the name 
of a principle, a religion or an ideology (ibid., pp, 44, 49). Living by the dic-
tate of others is to reject our freedom and dismiss an ethical responsibility for 
our own lives.  
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Beauvoir applies this idea in The Second Sex when she asserts that 
women are partly culpable for their oppressed situation (2010, p. 10). This 
culpability arises, in Beauvoir’s view, because in most cases, we have some 
responsibility for our own situation. Unless we are completely determined 
from outside, an agent can always choose to act one way instead of another. 
Apart from cases of extreme oppression, individuals cannot escape the moral 
responsibility for their lives and actions simply by claiming that they had fol-
lowed the rules or some authority. Consistently, and on every occasion, Beau-
voir argues against determinism—a view that denies ontological freedom (see 
Pettersen, 2009). 
 
C. The Paradox of Choosing to Be an Object 
 
One objection to the argument that our own freedom and that of others should 
be our leading normative goal is that if we are free, we can also choose to be 
un-free. But “deliberately to will oneself not free,” Beauvoir replies, is a con-
tradiction (1976, p. 25). Why? Simply because agents need freedom in order 
to voluntarily subjugate themselves to others, a topic Beauvoir explores in 
“Must We Burn Sade?” (2012a). “Un-free” has meaning only in relation to 
“free.” We cannot choose to be un-free unless we have the freedom to choose; 
consequently, it is a contradiction to want to choose to be un-free. Slaves, for 
instance, do not possess sufficient concrete freedom to choose between a free 
and an un-free life. 
However, even in the absence of concrete freedom, slaves still have on-
tological freedom—by virtue of being members of the human race. On the 
basis of their ontological freedom, they can choose to consent or oppose their 
own oppression. Therefore, one might suggest, slaves’ ontological freedom 
also allows them to choose to be the objects of others even if their concrete 
freedom does not. 
The problem with this argument is that human beings are not simply ob-
jects. Human beings are human precisely because they have ontological free-
dom. Hence, the choice to subjugate oneself cannot be made once and for all. 
Given the free will every human being possesses, slaves can change their 
mind at any time. They can choose to replace submission with revolt. Fur-
thermore, even if slaves never change their minds and always want to be un-
free, they can only do so by repeatedly choosing lack of freedom. This is only 
possible if they are free. If the other has forced them into slavery, they have 
not chosen to be un-free. However, in cases of extreme oppression or any other 
situation where ontological freedom has been demolished—something that is 
indeed possible—individuals cannot choose to be un-free. In “Preface to Tre-
blinka” (2012c), Beauvoir analyzes the impact an extremely oppressive situa-
tion can have on an agent’s possibilities to act.  
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Finally, choosing to be un-free is also to lock oneself inside facticity, to 
make one’s own life meaningless. Nobody really wants to live such an inhu-
man life, says Beauvoir; such a desire is an expression of self-deception. For a 
free being, willing not to be free is not only contradictory, but also self-
destructive (1976, p. 33). 
 
D. Free Recognition 
 
Persons who are the only free individuals among un-free persons, or who are 
completely alone in the world, will soon discover that their freely chosen 
goals and projects become meaningless. Initially, individuals must choose 
their own projects freely, but at some point they will need to have them 
acknowledged by others. This is not to say that one cannot enjoy a solitary 
hike, but when hikers reach a mountain peak, they may wish to have compa-
ny—or at least to share their accomplishments with others upon returning 
home. Likewise, one may enjoy writing in solitude, or tending the garden 
alone, but sooner or later, one craves the responses of others. Moreover, some 
projects can only be realized in cooperation with other people: My idea of 
how to solve a political problem will never be anything but a fantasy if I do 
not interact with others (Arp, 2001, pp. 71–72).  
We are mutually dependent rather than self-sufficient in our attempt to 
justify our existence in a meaningful way. Existential justification is, there-
fore, also constituted inter-subjectively; “there is no escaping it,” says Beau-
voir (1976, p. 72). Individuals need the approval of others in order not to be 
devastated with regard to their own individual finiteness, as well as to experi-
ence joy and meaningfulness (2004e, p. 97; see Pettersen, 2008). In other 
words, “no existence can be validly fulfilled if it is limited to itself. It appeals 
to the existence of others” (1976, p. 67). 
The recognition of others is only fully satisfactory when given freely by 
free subjects. “The other’s freedom alone is capable of necessitating my be-
ing. My essential need is therefore to be faced with free men,” Beauvoir 
claims. “My projects,” she continues, “lose all meaning not if my death is 
announced, but if the end of the world is announced to me” (2004e, p. 129). 
People whose ontological freedom remains intact must give the recognition; 
the response of an indoctrinated individual will not suffice. 
Those who respond to our projects must also have concrete freedom; if 
they are forced to voice an opinion, it is of little worth. Consequently, there is 
a correlation between my own freedom and the freedom of others. In Beau-
voir’s philosophy, my freedom and yours are not opposites, but interwoven. I 
cannot expect others’ free recognition, which I need, if I do not recognize 
them. We cannot force each other to mutual recognition, but we are all equal-
ly dependent on each other’s free recognition (ibid., p. 133, 1976, pp. 71–72). 
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Hence, denying or restricting others’ freedom means to deny oneself the 
freely given support of, and interaction with others.  
One might object that in order to receive the free recognition of others, it 
could be sufficient to assure the freedom and rights for some groups only, say 
the white and the heterosexuals. However, restricting freedom to only some 
groups not only concerns those who are directly deprived of their freedom and 
rights, but also, indirectly, to all. Later in life, someone might want a same-sex 
marriage or interracial friendship, only to find it banned by discriminatory laws 
or prejudices. As everyone’s chances of succeeding in living a meaningful life 
increase if the world is populated with free individuals, to support and work for 
extending freedom equally to all is in everyone’s mutual interest.  
The focus of existentialists on individual choice has often been inter-
preted as a sign of solipsism and lack of concern for community (Beauvoir, 
2004a). Beauvoir’s focus on inter-subjectivity and reciprocity counters this 
objection—or, at least demonstrates that it does not hold true for all versions 
of it. It makes her philosophical stance unique with regard to other existential-
ists and to a traditional moral philosophy that emphasizes the isolated and 
disconnected individual. Beauvoir’s focus on human interconnection also 
explains why the traditional border between ethical and political philosophy 
cannot be crystal clear in her normative thinking. 
 
E. Mutual Recognition and Authentic Relationships 
 
Mutual recognition has not only existential, ethical, and political implications, 
but also significant (inter)personal consequences, as the recognition of one’s 
own freedom and that of others—assuming moral freedom—is necessary in 
order to enter into authentic relationships. Authentic relationships such as real 
friendship and genuine love are, according to Beauvoir, important elements of 
a meaningful life; to recognize freedom of self and others constitutes a neces-
sary foundation for forming such bonds. Relationships are authentic when they 
are freely assumed and when the parties recognize others’ freedom as well as 
their own. Only on these terms can authentic love or genuine friendship devel-
op (2010, p. 735). In such relationships, each party recognizes the other and 
themselves as human beings equal to all others (neither inferior nor superior), 
and, at the same time, as unique from all others. Consequently, neither attempts 
to submit to the other or to oppress the other. On love, Beauvoir writes: 
 
Genuine love ought to be founded on mutual recognition of two liberties, 
the lovers would then experience themselves both as self and as the other: 
neither would give up transcendence, neither would be mutilated; togeth-
er they would manifest values and aims in the world. (2010, p. 677) 
 
The fundamental inter-subjectivity and the required reciprocity between free 
individuals—constitutive premises in Beauvoir’s philosophy—are also dis-
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played on the interpersonal and private levels: both parties in a relationship 
must maintain and exercise their own ontological as well as concrete freedom, 
and must expect and acknowledge the same for the other. In other words, both 
parties must also assume moral freedom in their private relationships in order 
for the relationships to be authentic. 
Persons who do not assume moral freedom will not function well in rela-
tionships. In The Second Sex, Beauvoir reveals how and why women trapped 
in immanence find life meaningless since they have not actively chosen this 
life. She also describes how women’s relationships are hampered due to sub-
missiveness (2010; see also Pettersen, 2007–2008). Inauthentic love, for ex-
ample, is characterized by lack of freedom and recognition. A tyrant is not 
free, Beauvoir points out (1976, pp. 61, 71). Indeed, a tyrant may have pow-
er—the concrete freedom to force others into submission—but will never feel 
real support or recognition from others as long as they are oppressed. Only in 
the company of other free human beings can we unfold as both unique and 
equal beings, and be recognized as such:  
 
[I]t is when the slavery of half of humanity is abolished and with it the 
whole hypocritical system it implies that the “division” of humanity will 
reveal its authentic meaning and the human couple will discover its true 
form. (2010, p. 766) 
 
F. Humanity—the Ultimate Goal of Transcendence 
 
Justifying our lives is an ongoing process with different stages. First, we must 
freely and deliberately choose our projects. In addition, we also need the 
recognition of other free individuals. However, others’ acknowledgement is 
not enough to bestow upon our lives an enduring purpose. Even if we enjoy 
the support and affirmation of a particular group—be it family, friends, or the 
politically like-minded—we still need, at some point, a wider justification of 
our projects and our existence. We also want to participate in something larg-
er, something extending beyond our mortal life, an ultimate justification of 
our projects. What could constitute such an ultimate justification of our pro-
jects and our transcendence?  
In Pyrrhus and Cineas, Beauvoir addresses several possible ultimate 
goals of our transcendence. One is to withdraw from the world and enjoy the 
moment (ataraxia), as both the Stoics and Cineas recommended. Another is 
to pursue the idea of the universal, as Hegel and Kant proposed; a third is to 
posit God as our ultimate objective—an option recommended by Kierkegaard 
among others. Beauvoir rejects all three. Instead, we “must turn toward men” 
(2004e, p. 106) and act for humanity. It is only in humanity that we can find 
the ultimate goal of our transcendence. Before inspecting what is meant by 
“humanity,” we shall review what humanity is not for Beauvoir. 
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When Beauvoir posits humanity as our ultimate goal, she rejects a view 
of humankind as a unified, impersonal entity with a common goal, which she 
believes Hegel and Kant advocate. She also rejects an impersonal, universal 
source from which all values originate, a view found in religion. She further-
more distances herself from Hegel’s and Karl Marx’s understanding of human-
ity as they ignore human beings’ ontological freedom by subjugating everyone 
in a deterministic, collectivistic movement. For Beauvoir, humanity is not a 
homogenous entity striving for the same goal. There is only a “plurality of 
concrete, particular men projecting themselves toward their ends on the basis 
of situations whose particularity is as radical and as irreducible as subjectivity 
itself” (1976, pp. 17–18). 
If humanity cannot be understood as an impersonal, unified, and collec-
tivistic movement, can one instead envision humankind as an assembly of 
separate and antagonistic individuals, where only particular perspectives and 
isolated projects exist? This view appears accurate, says Beauvoir, since “the 
place each one occupies is always a foreign place” and “the bread that one 
eats is always the bread of another” (2004e, p. 107). In other words, “I am an 
instrument for some, only by becoming an obstacle for others. It is impossible 
to serve them all” (ibid., p. 108). However, even if our acts are often in ten-
sion with those of others, Beauvoir also dismisses the view of human beings 
as fundamentally divided and antagonistic. Such a view contradicts her em-
phasis on inter-subjectivity and free, reciprocal recognition. Ignoring relation-
ality when describing humankind is just as deceptive as overlooking human 
beings’ ontological freedom. According to Beauvoir, human beings are relat-
ed, and “the me-others relationship is as indissoluble as the subject–object 
relationship” (1976, p. 72). 
How then, are we to understand the “indissoluble” relationship between 
others and oneself that needs to be taken into account in our conception of 
humanity? Beauvoir asks whether it might be a pre-established order between 
people working for the “accomplishment of human unity across temporal dis-
persion” such as promised by Hegel, or the idea of evolution, or perhaps an 
unbroken continuity between individual actions (2004e, p. 108). She rejects 
these views as well.  
No pre-given order between acts exists, and the assumption that there is 
continuity between each individual’s acts is highly problematic: if my son 
emulates and perpetuates my actions without the possibility to resist or refuse, 
it indicates a deterministic view of human beings. This is clearly not an accu-
rate depiction; human beings are free. Consequently, “if I am free, my son is 
also free,” and “actions cannot be transmitted across successive generations as 
if they were gliding along calm water” (ibid., p. 106). Every individual can 
act freely, and each generation can change the course of history. Therefore, 
“with each man humanity makes a fresh start” (ibid., p. 110). Beauvoir re-
peatedly insists that the individual’s freedom cannot be merged or subjugated 
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into a unit. Each human being’s ontological freedom is entirely separate; hu-
man beings cannot be considered as a whole.  
If each individual’s goal can neither be united with an overall goal, nor 
be viewed as completely separate and antagonistic, then perhaps individuals 
can be unified in groups, or classes? That is possible, says Beauvoir, but only 
by opposing another group or another class and thereby reintroducing a fun-
damental antagonism: “If I serve the proletariat, I combat capitalism: the sol-
dier only defends his country by killing its adversaries” (2004e, p. 108). It 
appears as if we cannot transcend humankind as such, only parts of it, because 
working for one part will always be to work against another. Cannot these 
groups then agree upon an overall goal—such as progress and enlightenment? 
Yes, but it can be difficult to reach a consensus on what is considered pro-
gress and enlightenment: the same person can be a martyr from one perspec-
tive, and a terrorist from another. Establishing a single goal for the whole of 
humanity is highly problematic, and potentially repressive. 
Therefore, at first glance, it would seem meaningless to “act for humani-
ty” when humanity cannot be considered an indivisible whole, or have a pre-
defined ultimate goal. Also, when no values are given—another constitutive 
premise in Beauvoir’s moral philosophy—it follows that there exists no 
a priori ultimate goal for humanity, just as there is no pre-given mission for 
each individual. In her own words, “each man’s life and all of humanity thus 
appear absolutely gratuitous at every instant, as neither required nor called by 
anything” (ibid., p. 110).  
All of the aforementioned views on humanity—be they Marx’s, Hegel’s, 
or Kant’s—derive from beliefs about human nature. This is precisely why 
Beauvoir rejects them; they are founded on philosophical anthropologies that 
depart significantly from her own existentialist depiction of human beings. 
Let me enlarge. The term “humanity” sometimes refers to all, or sometimes 
only to a group of human beings, past, present or future. Moreover, it is often 
linked with characteristics or attributes that are taken to be uniquely constitu-
tive of human beings (Giustiniani, 1985, pp. 168, 171). For instance, when 
uttering the phrase, “We are united in our common humanity,” “we” can be 
referring to a group of people, or all people collectively. What “we” are as-
sumed to share in virtue of being human, could be reason, emotions, a need 
for care, that we are beings loved by God—or ontological freedom. Beauvoir 
strongly emphasizes the final alternative, while clearly rejecting the penulti-
mate possibility. 
From this it follows that the expression “to act for humanity”—which 
Beauvoir suggests is the ultimate goal of our transcendence—is also closely 
related to her understanding of what characterizes human beings and, based 
on this, what she believes to be in their best interest. For Beauvoir, this is for 
all individuals to be able to exercise their freedom—together with other free 
individuals. Therefore, we can also suggest what it means to Beauvoir to have 
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humanity as the ultimate objective of transcendence: this involves sustaining 
and supporting freedom for all in an unending, unconstrained movement. In 
doing so, we uphold humanity’s defining characteristic, namely freedom. In 
this way, each individual’s project merges with a greater, meaningful project 
that transcends our mortal lives. Still, this merging does not destroy the indi-
vidual or particular, and does not define the future once and for all. The ulti-
mate goal of our transcendence is to act for humanity, and to act for humanity 
is to assume moral freedom.  
In addition to becoming part of a meaningful project that, by sustaining 
and supporting the freedom of all transcends individual mortality, acting for 
humanity has yet another quality. It is only through free interaction that we 
can make our human nature manifest—unlike non-human creatures, which 
live for the immediate satisfaction of needs or which are slaves of externally 
given doctrines. In addition, to provide an opportunity for people to express 
and acknowledge their individuality and to form the basis of authentic rela-
tionships, interaction between free individuals is also the only form of activity 
that has no goal beyond itself. In order to make this possible, we depend on 
others, for without interaction with other free persons, we would not be im-
mersed in a human world, a meaningful world, but only in an animalistic 
world without civilization and culture. To act for humanity, to take responsi-
bility for the freedom of self and other, is what makes us uniquely human. 
 
G. Existential Humanism 
 
The reason Beauvoir is so deeply preoccupied with humanity—the human 
condition, human needs and welfare, their lives, experiences and values—is 
because she is a humanist thinker. Beauvoir is a humanist thinker in several 
ways. She is trained as a scholar in one of the humanistic sciences; she fosters 
critical thinking; and she has a strong political engagement. She also reflects 
upon human beings from a broad range of perspectives, and uses an interdis-
ciplinary approach. More precisely, she develops a philosophy of human be-
ings’ being in the world, where their characteristics, experiences and welfare 
are the center of attention. In what follows, I shall enlarge on how, in this 
way, Beauvoir is a humanist thinker. 
Beauvoir develops a theory of humanity based on her conception of hu-
man nature. She is also a humanist thinker in the sense that she has developed 
a notion of what constitutes human nature. In contrast to anti-humanists such 
as Friedrich Nietzsche, the mature Marx, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Fou-
cault, and Judith Butler, Beauvoir does not entirely reject the idea of an im-
mutable human nature.  
Despite her de-masking and dismissal of several myths concerning hu-
man nature—and women in particular—she does not view some human fea-
tures such as ontological freedom, rationality, transcendence, and relationality 
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as simply historical or social constructions. Instead, she sees them as given by 
nature, and therefore formative of her philosophical anthropology. Further-
more, and most importantly, they are not considered as given only to select 
groups, for instance, Germans, French, white people, or men, and withheld 
from others. Beauvoir argues that “the Other”—those excluded from “human-
ity” such as women, the elderly, blacks, and Jews—must also be recognized 
as having the same characteristics and in turn the same rights and opportuni-
ties as those traditionally encompassed by “humanity.” Hence, her philosophy 
carries a strong appeal to act and engage in the world, to work for social jus-
tice—a hallmark of humanism. 
Moreover, as Beauvoir rejects religion and dismisses any supernatural or 
external guidance for our lives, her humanism is secular. Each individual has 
the right as well as the responsibility to give their own life meaning, value, 
and purpose by using their own reason. They are free—and expected—to ex-
amine any doctrine and value system before choosing to approve or reject it 
(1976, p. 156). In Beauvoir’s ethics, where individuals take responsibility for 
themselves and each other, human beings can be good without God; they can 
be moral and trustworthy beings through free and rational interaction. 
The emphasis Beauvoir places on human interactions in her ethics 
could, one may object, turn her humanism into a cult, where humankind is 
substituted for God, where the human being is taken as an end and supreme 
value to worship. This is not the case. As Jean-Paul Sartre also points out, 
existentialism does not view human beings as ends in themselves because 
they are constantly in the making. The cult of humanity, as expressed, for 
instance, by August Comte, “leads ultimately to an insular . . . humanism 
and—this needs to be said—to fascism. We do not want that type of human-
ism,” Sartre says, “but rather what is called an existential humanism” (2007, 
pp. 52–53). This is precisely what Beauvoir’s humanism is; it is first and 
foremost an “existential humanism.”  
Beauvoir herself, we should note, does not speak of her theory as “hu-
manism”; nor does she explicitly claim to be part of this tradition. Instead, she 
speaks of “humanity.” However, as humanism can be understood as a particu-
lar type of theory concerning humanity, based on a particular philosophical 
anthropology, in what follows, I shall examine Beauvoir’s understanding of 
humanity more closely. I want to demonstrate how her understanding of “hu-
manity” reveals and legitimizes my claim that she is not only a humanist 
thinker, but more precisely, an existential humanist thinker. 
The first reason why Beauvoir’s humanism is an existential humanism is 
exactly that she views humanity as an open-ended quest. Preserving and sus-
taining freedom is an infinite movement, a goal that cannot be surpassed. This 
accommodates the existentialist view that being human is always transcend-
ence (Beauvoir, 2004e, p. 106; Sartre, 2007, p. 52). As Beauvoir puts it: 
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It is a perpetual surpassing of itself; an appeal in need of response con-
stantly emanates from it; a void in need of fulfillment is constantly hol-
lowed out by it. . . . Our transcendence can never surpass humanity but 
only accompany it, and yet it will be completely grasped again in each 
instant because in each instant Humanity is. (2004e, p. 106) 
 
Moreover, Beauvoir’s notion of humanity as the ultimate goal of our transcend-
ence is a “thin” concept. The only predefined content of “acting for humanity” 
is to maintain and facilitate what it is that makes us human: our freedom to sur-
pass the given, and our freedom to choose our own projects. Since humanity, in 
Beauvoir’s existential humanism, is always in the becoming and never fixed or 
subjected to pre-established doctrines, it cannot become a cult (ibid., p. 106). 
Second, Beauvoir’s humanism is an existential humanism because it ful-
ly acknowledges two significant existential premises: there are no external 
legislators, and human beings create all values through their own choices 
(1976, pp. 15, 156). Since human beings have no external legislator, it is en-
tirely up to us if and how we want to respond to these fundamental and am-
biguous features of our situation. However, no matter what we do, or how we 
act, we participate in a perpetual creation of values. Even if we choose not to 
create, or refuse to adhere to any values, we still do. In that situation we have 
become—exactly as the critics of existentialism assert—ethical relativists or 
nihilists, deliberately indifferent to what values are created, destroyed or lost. 
This is also an ethical stand, and we are also accountable for being indifferent 
to the sort of values that are created and destroyed. However, if we chose to 
protect our own freedom and that of others—assuming moral freedom—we 
join a common project that transcends our own limited existence; we act on 
behalf of humanity per se. If we choose to respect the freedom of all individu-
als in their singularity, we act for humanity. To assume moral freedom is to 
place humanity as the ultimate purpose of our transcendence. This clearly 
makes Beauvoir’s humanism existential. 
The third reason why Beauvoir’s humanism is existential is that it is 
founded on her existential view of human beings. Her concept of humanity is 
closely related to her view of human beings as ambiguous beings, while un-
derstanding that each individual is situated as well as free, autonomous as 
well as dependent (Fullbrook and Fullbrook, 1998, pp. 104–105; Kruks, 2012, 
p. 60). This is the core of her existential-philosophical anthropology, and it 
colors her view of humanity and in turn her humanism. Based on this existen-
tial view of human beings, Beauvoir sees humanity as a collection of free and 
unique individuals, each with their own goals and aspirations: “Humanity is a 
discontinuous succession of free men who are irretrievably isolated by their 
subjectivity” (2004c, 109). However, as “no man is an island,” in Beauvoir’s 
philosophy, we also need the recognition of other free individuals, as well as 
the concrete freedom facilitated by others, in order to live meaningful lives. 
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This is why her concept of humanity, and in turn her humanism, embraces the 
freedom of both self and others (moral freedom).  
Sonia Kruks terms Beauvoir’s humanism an “ambiguous humanism” 
(2012, p. 32) and points out how it challenges the “abstract humanism” based 
on “the Western ‘man of reason.’” By this, Kruks means the “‘sovereign’ 
subject,” which is a humanism that also “functions ideologically; it masks and 
legitimizes structures of oppression” by viewing the “‘Others’ as (at best) 
‘dubiously human’” (ibid., p. 38). Beauvoir’s humanism, on the other hand, 
acknowledges the ambiguity of human existence, Kruks asserts. It is “a hu-
manism for which flourishing is not to be confounded with the presence of the 
individualistic liberal order that has accompanied abstract humanism in the 
West” (ibid., p. 32). Although ambiguity is an important aspect of Beauvoir’s 
humanism, it is an integral part of her existential philosophical anthropology. 
It should therefore be subsumed under what I argue is her existential human-
ism, not as an independent version of humanism. 
Fourth, when Beauvoir claims that acting for humanity is the ultimate 
goal of our transcendence, she situates humanism within the last stage of her 
existential ethics. By merging her existentialist ethics and a secular humanism, 
each individual becomes connected with humanity as a whole. This goal is 
transcendent and infinite, but not religious. Rather, it is human-made. This is a 
move that does away with the problem of existential restlessness and meaning-
lessness. Even though each individual is mortal, and our projects finite, hu-
manity is not. Beauvoir writes, “it is only by prolonging itself through the 
freedom of others that it manages to surpass death itself and to realize itself as 
an indefinite unity” (1976, p. 32). 
In addition, by linking humanism with existential ethics, Beauvoir avoids 
the problem of infinite regress in her moral philosophy. Having moral freedom 
as the ultimate goal of our transcendence is not just an instrument to achieve 
yet another end. Acting for humanity is also the ultimate goal of our transcend-
ence because it cannot be surpassed or completed, thus can never obstruct the 
infinite movement of freedom and transcendence (2004e, p. 106). By infusing 
existential ethics with humanism, Beauvoir sustains and fulfills the relational 
and intersubjective mode of thinking in her philosophy. It is not by turning 
inward, but by throwing oneself into the world and interacting with others for 
the good of humanity per se that our transcendence becomes truly meaningful. 
 
G. Moral Freedom and Responsibility 
 
Only in a free society can one throw oneself into the world and interact with 
other free individuals. Only in a free society are individuals granted the op-
portunity to choose their own projects, their relationships, and the possibility 
of participating in a common life. Such a society is not given by nature, but 
actively created by human beings. Some of our ancestors used their freedom 
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to facilitate such a life. They fought for causes such as the abolishment of 
slavery, women’s rights, and against fascism and the Nazi occupation. In their 
efforts, they made moral freedom their overall goal as they struggled to up-
hold their own and others’ freedom. At the same time, they were acting on 
behalf of humanity, as described by Beauvoir.  
If we choose not to join a common project because we are not willing to 
act on behalf of humanity by assuming moral freedom, we are free riders in 
the humanity project. We benefit from the concrete freedom others fought to 
preserve, but without wanting to do our share to maintain it and ensure its 
continuation. When we fail to embrace moral freedom, we stand passive in 
the face of those who seek to undermine concrete freedom, and we fail to 
support others in their attempts to defend it. Shared freedom is a common 
good, created by human beings. If the number of free riders grows beyond a 
critical limit, this common good, which depends for its survival on our ongo-
ing support, could collapse. By remaining passive or ignorant, or by actively 
exploiting others, we inflict damage on ourselves, on others and on humanity.  
Within the framework of Beauvoir’s existential ethics, our freedom and 
our interconnectedness have impact on our moral responsibilities. Both tell us 
what we can to do to support or destroy others. Ontological freedom is some-
thing each individual has by virtue of being human; it includes our free will 
and capacity to act autonomously. In Pyrrhus and Cineas, Beauvoir says that 
this freedom cannot be destroyed by others. Violence only affects the other’s 
external condition, not their ontological freedom (2004e, p. 124). As presented 
in Pyrrhus and Cineas, this is clearly a limitation in Beauvoir’s portrayal of 
freedom. She operates here with a problematic body–mind dichotomy, not quite 
compatible with her efforts elsewhere to transcend binary modes of thought. 
Moreover, this dichotomy is empirically unsustainable. Destruction of ontologi-
cal freedom is not limited to violence, torture, starvation, or imprisonment; it 
can also be damaged by daily neglect, lack of care and respect, violation of 
trust—and correspondingly be reinforced by mutual respect and recognition. 
Because each of us is always a part of others’ situations, it follows that 
we must aspire to not undermine their ontological freedom or destroy their 
concrete freedom. Although others’ ontological freedom cannot be penetrated 
directly, as can the body, it can definitely be demolished indirectly by vio-
lence and lack of concrete freedom. 
Many of our actions affect others’ concrete freedom. If we actively de-
prive others of their rights and livelihood–or hamper their struggle for con-
crete freedom–we become the facticity they fight against. In such situations, 
Beauvoir argues, violence can be permissible (ibid., pp. 97–98). Our moral 
responsibility, therefore, not only requires us to act for the good of humanity 
and do nothing to violate other people’s freedom, but it also requires us to 
avoid inhibiting their (struggle for) concrete freedom. We must make sure that 
our actions do not reduce or obstruct other people’s free transcendence. 
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H. Moral Freedom and Democracy 
 
The last reason we should assume moral freedom as our normative value con-
cerns the political conditions that allow us to live a human life, a life where 
transcendence is equally possible for all. Democracy as a political system is 
able to sustain concrete freedom. Concrete freedom, ensured by a democratic 
form of government, is as important as ontological freedom for us to live an 
authentic life. Only by living in a free society is a human life possible. 
Reciprocity also exists between each individual and society. Just as in-
dividuals must seek to preserve each other’s freedom, society and individuals 
must also mutually recognize each other’s freedom. What does this mean? 
According to Beauvoir, it means that, at every opportunity, the community 
must recognize the importance and dignity of each individual citizen—one by 
one. Society’s respect for each individual is demonstrated by the public 
recognition of every citizen as a unique individual able to create individual 
values and life. This is what democratic states understand, Beauvoir contends, 
and what totalitarian regimes violate (1976, p. 106). 
Society’s recognition of individuals, says Beauvoir, is expressed through 
arranging and facilitating ceremonies such as baptism, marriage and burial 
(ibid.). It is also expressed, one could add, by facilitating education, job op-
portunities, health-care, child-care, and safety for all citizens, and by sustain-
ing freedom of religion and speech and by invoking laws against discrimina-
tion. These arrangements are part of the concrete freedom each individual 
needs in order to use their ontological freedom and form authentic lives (Pet-
tersen, 2013). Beauvoir points out that totalitarian regimes confine citizens in 
their facticity, preventing them from exercising their ontological freedom and 
creating meaningful lives for themselves (1976, pp. 106–108). Also, one may 
add, in some liberal societies, only privileged citizens have the opportunity to 
exercise freedom.  
The political implication of Beauvoir’s moral imperative to act for hu-
manity—sustaining the freedom of self and all others—implies working for a 
society where concrete freedom extends to all citizens. In a democracy, hu-
manity is understood as a collection of unique individuals, while in a totalitar-
ian regime humanity is viewed collectively, as an entity that can be controlled 
and defined. 
In return for having their unique values recognized and for providing the 
necessary framework for living authentic lives, individuals must also recog-
nize society and act to maintain democracy. As Edward and Kate Fullbrook 
suggest, individuals can contribute to society in a number of ways—from the 
extreme sacrifice in emergency situations, to the daily care of fellow citizens 
or participating in elections (1998, pp. 110–112).  
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4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Beauvoir points to the importance of democracy and equal freedom in the 
public domain, as many political philosophers do. She further emphasizes that 
to live an authentic life and to become autonomous political and moral agents, 
interaction among equally free individuals in the private sphere is also re-
quired. She shares this focus with feminist ethics and virtue ethics. Moreover, 
she maintains, with Sartre and Kierkegaard, that every human being is unique 
and autonomous. She refuses to let the uniqueness and responsibility of each 
individual be swallowed up by collectivist theory. Beauvoir’s three aspects of 
freedom interact with three main spheres of human life: the individual, the 
social, and the political. This not only makes her philosophy conducive to dif-
ferent humanistic disciplines, it also makes her theory nuanced and complex 
enough to deal with real people facing real challenges in contemporary society.  
For Beauvoir, concrete freedom constitutes a public good, and its de-
fense a common goal. In its defense, she emphasizes the necessity of individ-
ual freedom, and at the same time argues that it must be restricted–by assum-
ing moral freedom. Clearly, we cannot force others to embrace moral free-
dom, to act for humanity, or to take responsibility for the common good. We 
can only, with Beauvoir and other humanist thinkers, expound how fragile 
and mutually dependent our freedoms are, and hope this insight will inform 
our actions.  
The arguments I have set forth, explaining why we should embrace mor-
al freedom and act on behalf of humanity, are also arguments for the im-
portance of the humanities. This is so because sustaining freedom also means 
helping to confront challenges that constantly threaten democracy and peo-
ple’s freedom. The many challenges facing contemporary society must be 
tackled in ways that do not undermine the freedom of individuals or of socie-
ty. In this, the humanities plays an imperative role.  
Beauvoir’s own groundbreaking work in philosophy and literature, dis-
ciplines at the very heart of the humanities, is the best demonstration of what 
the humanities can do. As a humanist thinker, Beauvoir questioned and chal-
lenged traditional values and conventions and paved the way for novel reflec-
tions. Today, the humanities can—and should—explore the origins, validity, 
and possible outcomes of new, as well as old, ideas. We can form an opinion 
on which arrangements are likely to maintain or undermine freedom—to fa-
cilitate or inhibit a human life. The humanities can guide politicians and deci-
sion makers by supplying arguments and perspectives, as well as empowering 
individuals to reject some values while sustaining others. Through its critical 
and creative reflections on human-made values, the humanities can maintain 
and develop a well-functioning democracy. 

 
